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NOTE 
THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERNATIONAL 
lAW DURING TIMES OF WAR 
Blake Lara 
I. Introduction 
Throughout history, war and armed conflict have maintained a con-
tinuous presence around the world.} Though the reasons for war 
change, various nations emerge and subside, and populations alter, 
one of the constant elements of war is its degrading effect on the envi-
ronment. 2 In addition to indirect effects on the environment that ulti-
mately result from war, nations have used the environment as both a 
weapon and target of war.3 For example, during the Peloponnesian 
War, the Spartans salted Athenian lands to make them infertile.4 In 
the Franco-Dutch War from 1672 to 1678, dikes and damns were de-
stroyed in order to create massive flooding. 5 Lastly, during the Viet-
nam War, the United States implemented a strategy that included 
massive rural bombings, chemical and mechanical deforestation, and 
large-scale crop destruction.6 
The international community has shown concern over and con-
demned this kind of wanton destruction of the environment. Prohibi-
tions against it are found in several treaties including the Additional 
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Additional Protocol I), 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD), and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Rome Statute). 7 However, extensive environmental 
damage from war, including widespread desertification and air and 
1. Eric Jensen, The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive 
Damage During Armed Conflict, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145, 146 (2005). 
2. Id. at 146-147. 
3. Rymn Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, "Greenkeeping," 
and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection During Armed 
Conflict, 10 CEO INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 441, 441 (1998). 
4. Laurent Hourcle, Environmental Law of War, 25 VT. L. REv. 653, 654 (2001). 
5. Id. at 655. 
6. Id. at 657. 
7. Elise Catera, ATCA: Closing The Gap In Corporate Liability For Environmental 
War Crimes, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 629 (2008). 
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water pollution, continues to exist today.8 The continuous nature of 
war and its destruction of the environment suggest a lack of criminal 
prosecution and an overall failure of these agreements to provide an 
effective deterrent.9 
The necessity of protecting the environment from unjustified dam-
age has not adequately been addressed despite the growth of military 
weapons and the violence that they can cause. IO In order to prevent 
destruction of the environment during war, international law must 
place enforceable limits on environmental damageY Determining 
how to place these limits can be very important in a world with ani-
mosities that could boil over into armed conflict at anytime.12 Overall, 
there have been two different views on how to proceed: modifY ex-
isting law so that it is properly implemented or create new interna-
tional law.13 
This comment will analyze current international laws that prohibit 
the destruction of the environment during wartimes and argue that 
these agreements are ineffective in their application. Specifically, it 
will provide an overview of three principle international agreements 
that have recently emerged to protect the environment from the 
harms of war. The inconsistencies of how environmental damage is 
defined as well as the limitations of when these agreements apply have 
led to environmental destruction without fear of punishment. In or-
der to effectively prevent this kind of wanton destruction, this com-
ment will offer solutions on how to hold nations accountable for their 
actions while repairing the damage inflicted on the environment. This 
includes broadening the scope of these international agreements to 
apply to all types of environmental harm and all nations who have the 
ability to harm the environment. 
II. Background 
A. Definition of the Environment 
Coming to a concise definition of the environment can be difficult 
when describing international law involving environmental warfare.14 
Modern thought attributes the environment to all natural features 
that make up the world's ecosystem.1 5 This includes the composition 
8. See James McClymonds, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An Inter-
national Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 583, 585-589 (1992). 
9. Catera, supra note 7, at 630. 
10. See Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: 
A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN.]' INT'L L. 165, 165-66 
(1992). 
11. Parsons, supra note 3, at 443. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. John Cohan, Modes of Warfare And Evolving Standards of Environmental Protec-
tion Under The International Law of War, 15 FLA.]. INT'L L. 481, 484 (2003). 
15. Id. at 485. 
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of the atmosphere, various types of land formations, and organisms 
such as animals and plants. 16 Some international agreements have at-
tempted to define the environment in this context, but with only lim-
ited success. 17 In addition to prohibiting environmental modification 
as a means of warfare, ENMOD defined the environment as "the dy-
namics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lith-
osphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space."18 
Unfortunately, this definition is very broad and provides little clarity.19 
Such a definition makes it difficult to enforce international agree-
ments, as all forms of war and armed conflict would have some type of 
impact on the environment.2o 
Some in the international community have defined the environ-
ment as "anything that is not man-made."21 They argue that the envi-
ronment is best defined broadly, so that any adverse change to the 
existing status of the environment constitutes environmental dam-
age.22 Also, the only reason for defining the environment and envi-
ronmental damage is an attempt to put an absolute limit on 
environmental damage that cannot be exceeded.23 These broad defi-
nitions of the environment reflect a growing belief by the interna-
tional community that environmental protections should be extended 
to all different situations involving war and armed conflict, no matter 
what the degree.24 
Compounding the struggle to enforce international agreements 
that endeavor to protect the environment are two competing views as 
to why the environment requires protection - the "utilitarian" and "in-
trinsic value" doctrines.25 The utilitarian doctrine values the environ-
ment for what it provides all living organisms - air, food, shelter, etc. -
and supports the protection of the environment only in so far as it 
provides means to further human beings ends and purposes.26 By con-
trast, the intrinsic value doctrine claims that the environment has in-
trinsic value, beyond the value it has for human beings and suggests 
that in order to protect the environment environmental issues should 
be filtered through a lens that places greater emphasis on the environ-
16. Id. 
17. Jensen, supra note 1, at 149. 
18. Walter G. Sharp, The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During 
Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REv. 1,20 
(1992). 
19. Id. 
20. Betsy Baker, Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, 33 
VA.]' INT'L L. 351, 364 (1993). 
2l. Sharp, supra note 18, at 32. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Merrit P. Drucker, The Military Commander's Responsibility for the Environment, 
11 ENVTL. ETHICS 135, 136-40 (1989). 
26. Id. 
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ment than on human interests.27 While not generally accepted by na-
tions, the intrinsic value doctrine has been gaining favor in the 
international community due to its emphasis on providing greater 
protections for the environment.28 
B. Environmental Affects oj War 
In addition to the impact on society, multiple facets of the environ-
ment are affected during times of war.29 The twenty-first century has 
created a much greater and more lethal risk due to the technological 
advances in military weaponry and tactics. 30 There are three main ar-
eas of the environment that are adversely affected by war - water sys-
tems, land, and air quality.3l First, the use of high-powered weaponry 
and dumping of toxic wastes contribute to the contamination of water 
sources.32 This not only affects water supply systems that cities rely on, 
but also destroys the ecosystems in the area.33 During the campaign in 
Iraq in 1991, the V.S. military used approximately 340 tons of missiles 
containing depleted uranium, a dense metal made from low-level radi-
oactive waste.34 The chemical residue of these weapons contaminated 
several groundwater sources.35 
War also contributes to air pollution due to the release of high 
levels of greenhouse gases.36 Emissions from the use of military vehi-
cles, machinery, and weaponry contribute to ground level and atmos-
pheric levels of air pollution.37 In 2008, the V.S. military used millions 
of barrels of oil in Iraq to fuel military vehicles.38 These military vehi-
cles produced hundreds of thousands of tons of harmful gases includ-
ing carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and carbon 
dioxide.39 
27. Id. 
28. Michael N. Schmitt, The Environmental Law oj War: An Invitation to Critical 
Reexamination, 6 U.S.A.F. ACAD. LEGAL STUD. 237, 238 (1996). 
29. Jessica Adley & Andrea Grant, The Environmental Consequences oj War, ENVI-
RONMENTALISTS AGAINST WAR (Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.envirosagainstwar 
.org/know / read. ph p?itemid=6360. 
30. Id. 
31. Anita Haynes, The Effects oj War on the Environment, SPELLMAN COLL., http:/ / 
www5.spelman.edu/bush-hewlett/ environ men tal policy / factsheets / war FS. 
html (last visited Jan. 13,2015). 
32. Adley & Grant, supra note 29. 
33. Id. 
34. WATSON INST. FOR INT'L STUDIES, Environmental Costs, COSTS OF WAR PRO-
JECT, http://costsofwar.org/article/ environmental-costs (last visited Jan. 
13,2015). 
35. [d. 
36. Id. 
37. Haynes, supra note 31. 
38. Environmental Costs, supra note 34. 
39. Id. 
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Lastly, the use of military machinery and toxic chemicals has caused 
unprecedented levels of deforestation and habitat destruction.40 De-
forestation causes a serious disruption to ecosystem services, including 
erosion control, water quality, and food production.41 During the 
Cambodian Civil War, 35% of Cambodia's intact forests were de-
stroyed due to illegallogging.42 Widespread flooding resulted, damag-
ing rice crops and causing food shortages.43 These are just a few 
examples that show the severe effect of war on the environment.44 
Without any effective law to prevent these kinds of actions, the poten-
tial magnitude of environmental destruction will increase.45 
C. International Law of War 
1. Customary Principles of War 
The foundation for current international laws, specifically those 
regulating the laws of war, can be found in customary principles of 
internationallaw.46 These are unwritten principles that have generally 
been accepted by the world's military forces and remain significant 
despite the adoption of modern agreements.47 There are three core 
principles that have been long respected in the law of war: military 
necessity, proportionality, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering 
(or humanity).48 As with any decision to engage in combat, nations 
have to balance competing interests, including taking these customary 
principles into consideration.49 This means balancing the means and 
methods of military combat to the extent that human interests out-
weigh environmental interests, from a utilitarian point of view, or vice 
versa, from an intrinsic value perspective.50 
The first principle, military necessity, provides that a combatant is 
justified in applying any force necessary to secure the complete sub-
mission of the enemy as soon as possible - as long as the means are 
not prohibited by provisions of the law of war.51 In other words, mili-
tary necessity places restrictions on the degree of force that may be 
40. Adley & Grant, supra note 29. 
41. Id. 
42. Haynes, supra note 31. 
43. Id. 
44. See S.M. Enzler, Environmental E,Yfects of Warfare, LENNTEcH, http:1 I 
www.lenntech.com/environmental-effects-war.htm (last updated Sept. 
2006). 
45. Id. 
46. Capt. William A. Wilcox, Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. LJ. 
299, 301 (1993). 
47. Id. at 302. 
48. L. Lynn Hogue, Identifying Customary International Law of War in Protocol I: A 
Proposed Restatement, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 279, 297 (1990). 
49. Cohan, supra note 14, at 491. 
50. Id. 
51. Wilcox, supra note 46, at 302. 
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used.52 Any destructive act must be necessary for prompt submission 
of the enemy, use the least amount of resources, and cannot be pro-
hibited by law.53 This principle was originally embodied by the Hague 
IV Convention, which in Article 23(g) prohibits acts that "destroy or 
seize the enemies property, unless such destruction or seizure be im-
peratively demanded by the necessities of war."54 Though there is dis-
cussion over whether the article applies to all property or just state 
property, both the U.S. Army and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross adopted it in order to protect any property, however situ-
ated or owned.55 
Next, the humanity principle resembles the utilitarian point of view 
by prohibiting methods and means of warfare that are inhuman or 
cause needless suffering. 56 It can be violated with respect to the envi-
ronment in many ways, such as poisoning water supplies or dispersing 
chemical agents to infect a human population or contaminate its 
crops and livestock. 57 The heart of this principle is the idea that mili-
tants should not take certain actions targeting human populations. 58 
Traditionally, the humanity principle strictly pertained to direct 
human suffering, so that while certain acts, such as torture or rape, 
were impermissible under any circumstance, it did not lend the same 
kind of prohibition to acts on the environment that had an indirect 
effect on humans. 59 However, the devastation from wars in the last few 
decades has suggested a shift in the scope of the principle to include 
actions affecting the environment.6o 
Finally, the proportionality rule prohibits methods of warfare likely 
to cause injury to civilians in excess of any concrete and direct military 
advantage.61 This principle operates as a medium between military ne-
cessity and humanity, and emphasizes that the loss oflife and property 
be in proportion to the execution of the military objective.62 Inherent 
52. Andrew McClintock, The Law of War: Coalition Attacks on Iraqi Chemical and 
Biological Weapon Storage and Production Facilities, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 633, 
641 (1993). 
53. Id. 
54. Foreign Treaties and International Agreements; {Multinational], 36 Stat. 2277, 
2302 (Oct. 18, 1907). 
55. Schmitt, supra note 28, at 63. 
56. Declaration of St. Petersburg Renouncing the Use of in Time of War of 
Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes in Weight, (Nov. 29, 1868), re-
printed in 1 AM. J. INT'L. L. 95. 
57. Mark Sameit, Killing and Cleaning in Combat: A Proposal to Extend Foreign the 
Claims Act to Compensate for Long-Term Environmental Damage, 32 WM. & MARy 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 547, 555-556 (2008). 
58. Id. 
59. Cohan, supra note 14, at 496. 
60. Id. 
61. Simonds, supra note 10, at 168. 
62. Id. 
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in the proportionality principle is the element of discrimination.53 
Discrimination requires weapons and tactics to clearly discriminate be-
tween military objectives and civilian targets.54 Indiscriminate attacks 
are prohibited by international law, but do not include attacks that 
indirectly cause collateral or incidental damage to civilians or prop-
erty.55 The difficulty with this principle is that it requires militants to 
calculate what the value of life and property is in order to decide what 
is proportiona1.55 This becomes a problem when these values differ 
dramatically across different populations. 57 
11. Environment-Specific Treaty Law 
Military actions have always adversely impacted the environment, 
however, only in the past several decades has the international com-
munity begun to take notice of the impact.58 Specifically, not until the 
Vietnam War did international attention focus on the issue of the en-
vironment.59 Ecocide, the willful destruction of the environment, was 
coined during the Vietnam War due to strategic and tactical decisions 
that directly targeted the environment.7o In 1977 two significant devel-
opments were produced with the intent of protecting the environ-
ment during armed conflict - Additional Protocol I and ENMOD.71 
There are two provisions in Additional Protocol I that explicitly ad-
dress the environment - Articles 35(3) and 55(1): 
ARTICLE 35. BASIC RULES. 
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the con-
flict to choose methods and means of warfare is not 
unlimited. 
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and mate-
rial and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering. 
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause wide-
63. Mark Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern War-
fare: Customary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.c. ENVfL. AFF. L. REv. 
479,495 (1993). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Cohan, supra note 14, at 494. 
67. Id. 
68. Peter J. Richards & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting 
the Environment During Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON L. REv. 1047, 1052 (1999). 
69. Id at 1053. 
70. Michael D. Diederich]r., "Law of War" and Ecology -AProposalfora Workable 
Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the Law of War, 136 MIL. L. 
REv. 137, 148-149 (1992). 
71. Id at 149. 
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spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.72 
ARTICLE 55. PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENT. 
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural envi-
ronment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. 
This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods 
or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected 
to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. 
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals 
are prohibited.73 
Despite the overlap between Article 35(3) and 55(1) regarding 
"widespread, long-term and severe damage," there is a slight distinc-
tion. 74 Taken as a whole, the primary difference between Additional 
Protocol I and other international agreements is that once the degree 
of damage to the environment reaches a certain level, Additional Pro-
tocol I does not employ a balancing of the customary principles of 
international law.75 Instead, this level is established as an absolute 
maximum of destruction.76 Once environmental destruction reaches 
a certain point, the limit on "widespread, long-term and severe" vio-
lates Article 35(3) and the military action causing it must stop.77 
On the other hand, Article 55 (1) includes an additional factor in 
the analysis by requiring that the environmental damage in question 
threaten "the health or survival of the population" before being pro-
hibited. 78 In other words, Article 55(1) sets a standard measured by 
the environmental impact on human beings.79 The purpose for this 
ambiguous approach was to satisfy advocates of the intrinsic value doc-
trine in Article 35 by setting terms strictly regarding the environment, 
and opponents who support the utilitarian doctrine in Article 55 by 
factoring humans into the equation.80 
The second treaty that was drafted as a result of the Vietnam War 
was the 1977 ENMOD Convention.81 The purpose of ENMOD is to 
limit the use or modification of the environment as a tool or weapon 
72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
tocol I),june 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol IJ. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S SCH., OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK 14-18 (1998). 
76. Id. 
77. Additional Protocol I, supra note 72. 
78. Id. 
79. Richards & Schmitt, supra note 68, at 1061. 
80. Id. 
81. Roman Reyhani, Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict, 14 Mo. 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 323, 324 (2007). 
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although the language is very similar to Additional Protocol 1.82 Arti-
cle I of ENMOD states this objective: 
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to en-
gage in military or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury 
to any other State Party. 
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to as-
sist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or inter-
national organization to engage in activities contrary to the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.83 
Environmental modification techniques refers to "any technique 
for changing - through the deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes - the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, in-
cluding its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of 
outer space."84 While ENMOD does use the same parameters - "wide-
spread, long-lasting or severe" - as Additional Protocol I, it does not 
limit them to effects on the natural environment.85 Furthermore, Ad-
ditional Protocol I requires all three criteria to be met before its provi-
sions can take effect while ENMOD simply requires anyone of the 
three be met.86 Still, confusion exists between the meanings of "wide-
spread," "long-lasting," and "severe."87 The Conference of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament produced the following definitions: 
It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the pur-
poses of this convention, the terms "widespread", "long-last-
ing" and "severe" shall be interpreted as follows: 
a) "Widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of sev-
eral hundred square kilometers; 
b) "Long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approxi-
mately a season; 
c) "Severe": involving serious or significant disruption or 
harm to human life, natural and economic resources or 
other assets. 
It is further understood that the interpretation set forth 
above is intended exclusively for this Convention and is not 
intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or simi-
82. Id. 
83. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977,31 U.S.T. 333 [herein-
after ENMOD]. 
84. Id. 
85. Susan Chamorro & Edward Hammond, Post-Cold War Conflict and the Envi-
ronment, SUNSHINE PROJECT (Sept. 29, 2001), http://www.sunshine-project 
.de/Themen/ enmod/ enmod_pos_cold_war.html. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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lar terms if used in connection with any other international 
agreement. 88 
Struggling to actually hold nations who violated these treaties ac-
countable, the international community adopted the Rome Statute in 
July 1998.89 Along with establishing an International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to act as an enforcement mechanism, the Rome Statute inde-
pendently sanctioned environmental war crimes and provided for the 
punishment of those who committed such crimes.90 Under the lan-
guage of the Rome Statute, intentional infliction of harm to the envi-
ronment would constitute a war crime that would require some form 
of punishment.91 More Specifically, Article 8(2) (b) (iv) of the Rome 
Statute prohibits: 
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated.92 
There are three principal components to the language of Article 
8(2) (b) (iv): 
(1) the actual physical act, which consists of inflicting 'wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage' to the natural environ-
ment; (2) the mens rea, namely that the infliction of this 
harm must be done intentionally and with knowledge that 
the attack will create 'widespread, long-term and severe dam-
age' to the natural environment; and (3) even if both the 
physical and mental elements are found, military advantage 
can operate as a defense to criminal wrongdoing.93 
In order to prosecute someone under the Rome Statute that indi-
vidual must have launched an attack that caused "widespread, long-
term, and severe damage to the natural environment.,,94 Similar to 
Additional Protocol I, a conviction can only result after it is deter-
mined that all three elements are conjunctively proven.95 Unfortu-
nately, the Rome statute is silent on the specific meaning of 
88. ENMOD, supra note 83. 
89. Mark Drumbl, International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, 
and Environmental Security: Can the International Criminal Court Bridge the 
Gaps?, 6 ILSA]. INT'L & COMPo L. 305, 306 (2000). 
90. Id. at 306-10. 
91. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2) (b) (iv), Jul. 27, 
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
92. Id. 
93. Drumbl, supra note 89, at 314. 
94. Rome Statute, supra note 91. 
95. See id. 
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"widespread," "long-term," and "severe."96 However, prior existing in-
ternational law has determined that "widespread, long-term and se-
vere" describes the "the size of the geographical area affected by the 
damage, its persistence in time, and the extent or intensity of the 
damage."97 
After these elements have been proven, criminal sanction will only 
fall upon an individual who knows his or her behavior will cause wide-
spread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment and, albeit 
proof of this knowledge, still commitS the act with the full intention of 
causing the environmental damage.98 In other words, the individual 
must be found to have acted intentionally and with knowledge that 
the attack will cause the prohibited environmental damage.99 The 
United Nations has interpreted the word "knowledge" as requiring 
the person committing the act to know that the desired consequences 
would occur, and determined that it is inferred from relevant facts 
and circumstances. IOO It is important to note that there is no liability 
for negligently or carelessly inflicting widespread, long-term, and se-
vere damage to the environment, which means that persons who are 
found to act negligently will not face any sanction at all. IOI 
Even if intentionally widespread, long-term, and severe damage is 
inflicted on the environment, liability is only found if the damage is 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated.102 This limitation on liability is similar to the 
principle of military necessity in that a proportionality test must be 
applied to determine if any harm that is inflicted on the environment 
is additional to the harm necessary to complete the military objec-
tive. I03 Although the Rome Statute does not provide any definitions or 
examples of what is "clearly excessive," states have expressed a com-
mon understanding that the military advantage anticipated from an 
attack is intended to refer to the attack as a whole and not from iso-
lated or particular parts of the attack.104 
III. Issue: Ineffectiveness of International Agreements 
The continuation of environmental destruction without fear of pun-
ishment and lack of accountability for war-related crimes since 
96. See id. 
97. ENMOD, supra note 83. 
98. See Rome Statute, supra note 91. 
99. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 15 June - 17 
June, 1998, &part of the Preparatory Commission on the &tablishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2 (July 17, 1998). 
100. Id. 
101. See Rome Statute, supra note 91. 
102. Id. 
103. Drumbl, supra note 89, at 319-2l. 
104. Id. 
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Nuremburg illustrate the ineffectiveness of international law as a de-
terrent. I05 Several reasons exist that explain why international law has 
not been a successful tool in prosecuting environmental war 
crimes. 106 First, the laws that operate to safeguard the environment 
exhibit overall vagueness and inconsistency.l07 Specifically, there is a 
lack of international consensus in the application of international 
agreements. 108 The three agreements previously mentioned all pro-
scribe "widespread," "long-term," and "severe" damage to the natural 
environment. 109 However, problems arise when trying to reconcile the 
meaning of these terms because they are either very broadly defined 
or not defined at all within the agreement. 110 
Additional Protocol I, ENMOD, and the Rome Statute all place a 
limit on the kind of environmental destruction that can be toler-
ated. lll This fact alone presupposes that these agreements will accept 
a certain amount of harm to the environment. Regardless, several 
forms of military activity remain insufficiently regulated. 112 Collateral 
damage that results from warfare is not specifically mentioned in any 
of the agreements and even intentional, and direct damage to the en-
vironment is permissible if it does not fall under any of the required 
provisions. 113 One provision, in particular, requiring militants to im-
plement a proportionality test to balance what is required to meet the 
military objective against harm to the environment is unclear due to 
the lack of a set standard. 114 
Another problem with these international agreements is that they 
only apply to nations that have ratified them.115 This can be an issue 
when trying to deter nations from taking actions that harm the envi-
ronment if they participate in large-scale military activities worldwide, 
and the international agreements have no authority. 116 For example, 
the United States has not ratified either Additional Protocol I or the 
Rome Statute, and although they have ratified ENMOD, it only specifi-
cally applies to the manipulation of the environment as a weapon. 117 
As a result, under these agreements the United States can contribute 
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to the destruction of the environment during times of war either as a 
direct or indirect act. 
Finally, the ICC, which was established by the Rome Statute, has not 
been effective in deterring environmental crimes.118 One issue is that 
the ICC has jurisdiction over and punishes crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.1l9 Environmental damage during 
times of war is a relatively small category within these offenses and, as 
a result, is often overlooked.120 The judges that make up the ICC typi-
cally do not have the expertise in the area of environmental law and 
are, therefore, less likely to come to a viable ruling.121 Also, the juris-
diction of the ICC is limited to natural persons. 122 This limitation 
makes it impossible to hold the state or military liable for the environ-
mental damage it causes. 123 Finally, the punishments that are en-
forced are based on imprisonment and fines. 124 This excludes 
restitution and civil liability, which would repair the harm that was 
caused to the environment.125 
IV. Analysis 
A. The Gulf War 
Over two decades have passed since the Gulf War, yet it remains an 
unsettled event.126 While insignificant in political history, the Gulf 
War truly made visible the disturbing effects of war on the environ-
ment.127 Environmental destruction, previously regarded as incidental 
to war, became a fundamental part of military strategy.128 The Gulf 
War was termed an "eco-war" due to the deliberate attacks that the 
Iraqi military made against the environment. 129 Outraged by these 
acts, states and international organizations demanded that Iraq be 
held accountable for the actions its military toOk.130 Unfortunately, 
118. Mark Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move From War 
Crimes to Environmental Crimes, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 122, 145 (1998). 
119. Beth Fain, The International Criminal Court: An Eminent Impact on a Hesitant 
United States, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 165 (2004). 
120. Id. 
121. See Mark Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. erN L. 
REV. 1,8-9 (2005). 
122. Drumbl, supra note 118, at 149. 
123. Id. at 150. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Paul Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. REv. 
425 (1993). 
127. Id. 
128. Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental 
Damage: Challenges to International Law After the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 
405,405-406 (1995). 
129. Id. at 406. 
130. Id. 
154 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 4 
neither Additional Protocol I nor ENMOD were able to provide this 
kind of remedy. 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops invaded the neighboring nation of 
Kuwait. 1S1 Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein, wanted to seize control 
over Kuwait due to disputes over oil production and sales. 1S2 President 
Hussein believed that because Kuwait had historically been situated 
within Iraq's borders, Iraq was entitled to Kuwait's oil resources and 
revenues. IS3 The United Nations closely monitored the Iraqi occupa-
tion of Kuwait and drafted a series of resolutions mandating the un-
conditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. 134 When the deadline for 
withdrawal expired, a coalition of military forces was authorized to use 
force against Iraq for failing to comply with the withdrawal order. 135 
Intense bombing in Iraq ensued, causing Iraqi forces to retaliate by 
launching an attack on the Persian Gulf. 136 
Iraqi forces bombed one of the largest oil fields in Kuwait, two ma-
jor mainland refineries, an offshore loading terminal, and anchored 
tankers. 137 The burning oil wells emitted dense smoke that detrimen-
tally affected the air quality in the region. 138 Outbreaks of respiratory 
and skin disorders occurred due to air containing the oil fire's nox-
ious fumes. 139 Also, Iraq pumped several million barrels of oil into the 
Persian Gulf from supply lines between refineries and an offshore ter-
minal, creating a slick at least nine miles long. 140 The spill affected 
wildlife in the region and contaminated the freshwater supply to bor-
dering nations. 141 
Under these circumstances, it would be rational to think that both 
Additional Protocol I and ENMOD would apply, however, neither did. 
There are several reasons why Iraq did not violate Articles 35 (3) and 
55(1) of Additional Protocol I by spilling oil into the Gulf and burn-
ing Kuwaiti oilfields. 142 First and foremost, Iraq has not signed or rati-
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fied Additional Protocol I, so it is not bound by its prohibitions.143 
Nonetheless, if Iraq were a party to the agreement, it still would not 
have breached the terms.144 Articles 35(3) and 55(1) do not apply to 
conventional warfare. 145 The text of Additional Protocol I states, "bat-
tlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare would not nor-
mally be proscribed by this provision."146 While conventional warfare 
is not explicitly defined, it includes oil spills and oil fires. 147 The 
United States Department of Defense stated, "the prohibitions on 
damage to the environment contained in Protocol I were not in-
tended to prohibit battlefield damage caused by conventional opera-
tions and, in all likelihood, would not apply to Iraq's actions in the 
Persian Gulf War." 148 Finally, the oil spills and oil fires did not cause 
"widespread, long-term, and severe damage."149 While widespread and 
severe are undefined, long-term refers to "several decades."15o None 
of the actions taken by Iraq could be considered long-term in this 
sense; therefore, they do not meet the threshold. 151 
Similar to Additional Protocol I, Iraq is not bound by the prohibi-
tions in ENMOD because it has not ratified the convention.152 How-
ever, even if Iraq were bound, it still would not have violated any of 
the terms within the agreement.153 ENMOD strictly prohibits environ-
mental modification techniques that change the environment 
through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes. 154 Al-
though there are few examples of what qualifies as an environmental 
modification technique, it is unclear whether oil spills and oil fires 
would fall under this standard. 155 Many writers who have attempted to 
interpret the agreement have determined that the environment was 
not used as a weapon during the Gulf War.156 "It might well be as-
serted that this was, rather, a case of the deliberate abuse of man-
made installations and artificial processes of damage to the environ-
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ment, but not necessarily damage by the forces of the 
environment."157 
B. Darfur 
In 2003, two Darfuri rebel organizations - the Sudan Liberation 
Army and the Justice Equality Movement - took up arms against the 
Sudanese government due to the uneven development and socio-
economic marginalization in Darfur. 158 In order to fight the insurrec-
tion, the Sudanese government employed Arab militias known as 
Janjaweed, which operated as a supplement to the Sudanese Army.159 
However, these forces directly targeted millions of civilians in Dar-
fur.160 Hundreds of villages were destroyed and numerous crimes 
against humanity were committed, including murder, rape, and pillag-
ing. 161 In addition to these crimes, the conflict accelerated the envi-
ronmental degradation of Darfur that had been occurring over many 
years.162 The main concern was uncontrolled deforestation because of 
the reliance on timber and wood to fuel the war. 163 Also, militants 
burnt and destroyed crops and livestock leaving vast farmland arid. 164 
The ICC's investigation into the conflict in Darfur officially opened 
in 2005 after being referred by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil.165 However, it has failed to prosecute any of the individuals re-
sponsible for the crimes that took place. 166 The ICC ordered 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, his Defense and Interior Minister, 
and a militia leader to face charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.167 Even though Sudan is a signatory to, but has not ratified 
the Rome Statute and consistently rejects ICC jurisdiction over its na-
tionals and crimes committed in its territory, the ICC can still proceed 
without the consent of the respective state. 168 
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The ineffectiveness of the ICC in this case stems from the lack of 
cooperation with Sudan and the absence of an actual investigation.169 
Chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda stated that "given this council's lack 
of foresight on what should happen in Darfur, I am left with no choice 
but to hibernate investigative activities in Darfur as I shift resources to 
other urgent cases."170 As a result, the victims of these attacks are left 
without any justice and the environment is left unrepaired. 171 
C. Solutions 
1. Improve Existing International Agreements 
To adequately protect the environment during times of war and 
hold those who cause environmental destruction responsible, existing 
international law must change. 172 Both Additional Protocol I and EN-
MOD should be amended, or rejected altogether to allow a new inter-
national agreement, in order for international law to be effective.173 
Regardless, international law must be structured in a way that is spe-
cific and can be understood by the international community.174 This 
means that terms such as "widespread," "long-term," and "severe" 
should be specifically and similarly defined if present in other interna-
tional agreements.175 This will prevent any confusion in trying to in-
terpret these terms, such as the case in attempting to apply Additional 
Protocol I and ENMOD to the Gulf War. 176 In addition, any amend-
ment or new proposal must be fashioned to protect the environment 
in all types of conflicts. 177 This includes incidental or indirect damage 
to the environment, in addition to directly targeting or manipulating 
the environment.178 
Next, international law should not distinguish between who is and is 
not a party to the agreement, but should apply worldwide. 179 The key 
detriment to Additional Protocol I and ENMOD is its failure to apply 
to those nations that do not ratify or sign the agreement.180 Under 
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this standard, several nations are able to inflict damage against the 
environment without punishment from international law. 181 
Individually, Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I should be modi-
fied to reduce the requirement of liability for environmental dam-
age. 182 Instead of requiring a state or individual to meet all three 
elements: (1) widespread; (2) long-term; and (3) severe, it would be 
beneficial if, like ENMOD, liability were based on the occurrence of 
only one element. 183 Environmental damage that is described as wide-
spread, long-term or severe presents a danger to the environment and 
should be treated as such. 184 On the other hand, both Article 2 and 3 
of ENMOD limit the application of the agreement. 185 Article 2 refers 
to environmental modification techniques as deliberate actions. 186 Ar-
ticle 3 discounts the application of ENMOD to environmental modifi-
cation techniques that are used for peaceful purposes.187 ENMOD 
should provide that any direct or indirect action that causes damage 
to the environment is a violation, regardless of whether it occurs in 
times of armed conflict or peace. 188 
In order to ensure the long-term success of the ICC, there are sev-
eral adjustments that must be made. 189 First, in order to become more 
efficient, there must be rules in place to ensure the full support of all 
the states that have either signed or ratified the Rome Statute. 190 This 
includes implementing consequences for disobedience such as eco-
nomic sanctions, trade sanctions, or aid reduction, if states refuse to 
bring forward ICC fugitives. 191 Another solution is to broaden the re-
quirements of the Rome Statute relating to the type of environmental 
damage that is prohibited.192 Because the ICC only prosecutes the in-
tentional infliction of environmental harm, it does not deter the activ-
ities that cause the greatest amount of harm, negligent or reckless 
conduct. 193 Alternatively, in order to repair the environment back to 
its former condition, the ICC should hold individuals civilly liable in 
addition to or instead of imprisonment.194 
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Next, the ICC should undertake the task of encouraging the United 
States to sign and ratify the Rome Statute. 195 If accomplished, the ICC 
would receive more support, in terms of financial assistance, and 
power, which would enable the court to function properly.196 In order 
for the United States to sign and ratify the Rome Statute, the ICC 
would need to add an amendment to the agreement specifying that 
terrorist acts and environmental damage are considered war 
crimes.197 
11. Eliminating Dangerous Military Weaponry 
Aside from altering current international law, harm to the environ-
ment can be prevented by eliminating the source - weapons that 
cause widespread destruction. 198 Instead of attempting to define 
"widespread, long-lasting, and severe," international law could create 
legislation to eliminate the manufacturing and use of all weapons that 
have the ability to violate these conditions. The most damaging weap-
ons are indiscriminate and have the potential for large-scale dam-
age.199 Examples include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
and certain types of explosives.20o Despite the fact that many states are 
committed to eliminating these weapons, there are still several states 
that possess them.201 The existence of these weapons creates the po-
tential for destruction and proliferation of weapons in other states.202 
Unfortunately, prohibiting a category of weapons based on its envi-
ronmental impact would be difficult to define and costly to imple-
ment.203 However, rehabilitating the environment after using 
dangerous military weapons could be even more difficult and costly. 
Also, dismantling these weapons would avoid inflicting future environ-
mental harm. Another way to limit the use of dangerous weapons is to 
increase the use of armed force as a mechanism to deter environmen-
tal damage during armed conflict.204 This includes intelligence-gath-
ering capabilities, such as space based and aerial reconnaissance, to 
identify existing threats.205 
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111. Increasing Environmental Awareness and Justice 
Greater transparency between the government and the public is 
crucial to ensure adequate protection of the environment. When pub-
lic concern for the environment reaches a certain level, the govern-
ment is likely to take such concerns into consideration before 
engaging in any military action. Due to the potential for public con-
cern, information about environmental damage that is inflicted by the 
government should not be kept from the public. A system of sharing 
information should be established worldwide to allow the public to 
know the environmental effects of every military operation. For exam-
ple, in the United States, the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right to Know Act of 1986 gathers information about toxic chemicals 
and makes it available to the public.206 The Environmental Protection 
Agency maintains a publicly accessible computer database and dis-
closes information to the public. 207 The information allows the public 
to identifY environmental concerns.208 
Additionally, due to the effect of environmental harm during war-
fare, the public should have a means of access to environmental jus-
tice. Any person affected by the environmental consequences of 
military action should be able to receive some form of compensation 
for the damage that they suffered to their health, welfare, etc. 209 Both 
public access to information and environmental justice will have a pos-
itive effect on the environment by causing states to think carefully 
before engaging in any activity that may harm human health or the 
environment. 
IV. Creation of a Fund to Restore the Environment 
Due to environmental destruction in times of war, responsible par-
ties should be obligated to pay the expenses of cleanup and rehabilita-
tion of the environment.210 However, states do not easily admit their 
responsibility for environmental damage and it can take a long time to 
attribute liability to a certain state.211 Therefore, to ensure effective 
environmental rehabilitation, an international fund should be estab-
lished.212 Taxing states that export arms technology, such as the 
United States, Russia, North Korea, South Mrica, and Israel, could 
finance an international fund. 213 If these states benefit from selling 
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arms and weapons, they must also alleviate the negative environmen-
tal effects potentially caused by their technologies.214 If a state takes 
significant efforts to avoid responsibility for its actions or is financially 
unable to pay for the expenses, the fund could then be used to help 
restore the environment. 
v. Employ Peacekeeping Forces 
The employment of peacekeeping forces could strengthen interna-
tional environmentallaw.215 Currently, the United States military and 
other nations engage in numerous peacekeeping operations.216 This 
trend should expand to a global peacekeeping power consisting of 
multinational armed forces. 217 Consistent with peacekeeping opera-
tions, the organization could assist with environmental and humanita-
rian protection.218 The organization could create economic 
disincentives to nations that manufacture and produce environmen-
tally injurious military technology.219 Other duties could include the 
monitoring and reporting of environmental damage.22o The environ-
ment has been used as a military target in recent war so peacekeeping 
forces could monitor the use of military weapons and report any delib-
erate attacks on the environment.221 When the peacekeeping forces 
possess sufficient capabilities, it should also employ force when neces-
sary, tailored to military and political circumstances used to deter, pre-
vent, and punish offenders. 222 
VI. Revise Military Manuals 
Incorporating environmentally friendly rules of law in national mili-
tary manuals could act as a secondary deterrent behind international 
law to prevent armed forces from inflicting harm to the environment 
both within the state and abroad.223 For instance, if military manuals 
prohibited the use of certain weapons or prohibited tactics that took 
advantage of the environment, then the military would comply with 
the requirement regardless of conflict within the state or abroad.224 
Moreover, if nations such as the United States were to include envi-
ronmentally friendly practices in military manuals then it may present 
a model for other nations to adopt.225 Overall, such practices would 
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not only be designed to prohibit environmental damage, but also pun-
ish those who commit unjustified damage.226 
D. Current Issues 
The present threat and violence of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) has led several nations, including the United States, to 
engage in some form of armed conflict against them.227 ISIS is be-
lieved to consist of up to 30,000 combatants and continues to grow as 
the extremist group spreads further into Iraq and Syria.228 These com-
batants have displayed numerous inhumane acts through videos that 
show ISIS fighters torturing and executing unarmed prisoners.229 The 
United States has recently launched several rounds of airstrikes in an 
attempt to cripple the growth of ISIS.230 The airstrikes targeted ISIS 
oil installations used to turn crude oil into a refined product that can 
be smuggled to buyers in Turkey and Iraq.231 Government officials say 
that ISIS earns approximately $2 million a day from illegal oil sales.232 
However, the airs trikes are causing concern based on the possible 
environmental consequences that it can cause.233 Officials said that 
the attacks specifically on small-scale oil refineries instead of fixed oil 
fields were intended to minimize the potential for environmental 
damage.234 While attacks on the oilfields would further erode ISIS rev-
enue, it would also destroy natural resources belonging to the Syrian 
people and possibly lead to another situation similar to the Gulf 
War.235 Based on these attacks it seems that the United States has a 
good argument for legal military action. Under the doctrine of mili-
tary necessity, the airs trikes were the necessary amount of force used 
in order to eliminate specific oil refineries, which the government be-
lieves will lead to the downfall of ISIS. Also, the United States took 
deliberate measures to minimize their environmental effect and 
avoided damage that could be considered widespread, long-term, and 
severe. 
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The attacks in Gaza at the end of last year took an enormous toll on 
the environment.236 Israeli and Hamas airstrikes turned mosques, fac-
tories, schools, hospitals, and thousands of houses into rubble.237 Ap-
proximately four million tons of rubble was left after the attacks, 
however, ill-equipped facilities in Gaza could only handle a fraction of 
that amount.238 Included in the destruction were several farming ar-
eas that produce crops for local consumption.239 These areas are now 
wastelands and could take some time to eventually clear.24o In addi-
tion, Israeli strikes damaged a central power plant causing water 
pumps, which distribute water for domestic use, to stop working.241 
Finally, the destruction of Gaza's main sewage treatment plant caused 
untreated sewage to be sent into the Mediterranean Sea each day.242 
Based on the extent of the damage in Gaza, the attacks would most 
likely violate the Additional Protocol I and ENMOD standard of wide-
spread, long-lasting, and severe. The attacks have caused the death of 
thousands of civilians and displacement of millions more. Also, recon-
struction will cost approximately $7.8 billion and take almost a decade 
to complete.243 Unfortunately, no individual or state has been held 
liable for the damage caused. If states were, at the very least, held 
economically liable for the attacks then the process to rebuild Gaza 
would take less time and be less costly.244 
V. Conclusion 
International armed conflict creates several adverse effects that 
have the ability to impact various populations. One of the most costly 
effects is the destruction of the natural environment. Regardless of 
combatants' intent when nations go to war, damage to the environ-
ment in one form or another is virtually inevitable. Due to this effect, 
the international community has established agreements to try and 
hold states liable for their actions. However, several of these agree-
ments, including Additional Protocol I, ENMOD, and the Rome Stat-
ute have not been effective and have resulted in environmental harm 
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going unpunished.245 The biggest drawback between the agreements 
is how vague they are. Additional Protocol I, ENMOD, and the Rome 
Statute all prohibit attacks that cause "widespread, long-term, and se-
vere damage" to the environment. Unfortunately, neither agreement 
takes care in specifically defining those terms.246 Furthermore, Addi-
tional Protocol I and ENMOD only apply to states that have signed 
and ratified the agreement. 247 Both agreements are limited in this re-
spect and leave several nations free to take advantage of the environ-
ment without fear of consequence. 
The need for adequate international law becomes evident as tech-
nology develops. When the weapons of warfare become more ad-
vanced, combatants may be tempted to manipulate or attack the 
environment in new and more devastating ways. To prevent this, there 
are several ways international law should change to become more ef-
fective. Above all else, international agreements must be revised for 
clarification and become applicable to all states.248 In addition, the 
international community has favored taking proactive steps to deter 
environmental damage including the destruction of harmful weapons, 
establishing a fund to restore the environment, and utilizing an 
armed peacekeeping force. 249 Aside from revising international law, 
there are also several recommendations that nations should address 
themselves. One option is to increase environmental awareness. 250 
The public should be kept conscious of harmful military actions and 
put pressure on governments to rethink those actions. Another option 
is to include environmental rules of law in military manuals.251 Re-
gardless of what changes will actually be made to protect the environ-
ment during times of war, current conflict has shown that it is a 
growing problem that requires an immediate solution. 
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